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The Role of Planning Contracts in
the Conduct of French Industrial
Policy
Saul Estrin*
and
Peter M. Holmest
Planning contracts are in principle legally enforceable agreements between a
government and public or private corporations, devised within the framework of a
national plan and used to implement economic strategy. Many governments use
contractual agreements with enterprises as an instrument of industrial or social
policy; a recent example in the United States (U.S.) is the Chrysler rescue.
Several western capitalist economies, notably France, employ indicative plan-
ning systems to build and implement medium-range national economic strat-
egies. In recent years, proposals have emerged in France and elsewhere to link
government industrial aid through contracts to the achievement of specific per-
formance criteria related to broader national goals. Our aim in this paper is to
evaluate this potential tool of industrial policy conceptually and through French
experience with a contractual planning system.
The success of the Chrysler rescue in the U.S. highlights the advantages of
conditionality in industrial subsidies and argues for a more systematic approach
to industrial policy. The conditions attached were fairly strict and were met.
Proponents of other rescue schemes have become increasingly aware of the need
to tie grants to performance within a tight time schedule. At the same time, the
case history of Chrysler does not suggest an adequate rationale for the rescue of
some firms rather than others. Such economic intervention requires the formation
of industrial policy goals against which any particular industrial aid proposal can
be checked.
Industrial policy has to contain systematic sets of related "macro" and
"micro" criteria, with the "macro" criteria being derived from the government's
overall policy goals.' Although these are generally not made explicit in most
* Lecturer in Economics, London School of Economics. M.A. University of Cambridge; D.Phil.
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1. This is with respect to inflation or the level of unemployment.
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countries, in France they are elaborated in the National Plan. While plan pri-
orities may be unwise or obscure, and may well be ignored in practice, the
existence of the planning system means day-to-day policies need not result only
from ad hoc interest group lobbying. The "micro" criteria for effectiveness are
the specific conditions attached to an individual loan. These are similar to the
conditionality accompanying loans by the IMF or the World Bank. However,
these conditions will differ from those imposed by private bankers who are
primarily concerned with the security of their loans and rapid repayment.
Explicit overall national objectives, perhaps relating to national or regional
employment, the balance of payments, the industrial composition of output or
technical change, are expressed in the form of the plan. The public authorities
wish to see those goals achieved whether or not private firms currently see them
as profitable. The next step is to identify the relevant actions that firms must take
to promote the national goals and to give firms inducements to act in the desired
way. Planning contracts are one method of inducement, imposing on firms per-
formance criteria which make the terms of repayment or the availability of further
funding contingent either on certain actions being carried out or on particular
results being achieved.
The French have a long history of state economic planning, of comprehensive
industrial policy, and of contractualised relations between the state and firms,
though the links between them have not always been close.' In the following
section we review the relevant history of French planning and industrial policy.
We focus in the second section on the development of contractual relations
between corporations and the state in postwar France until the Socialists took
office in 1981. In the third section we discuss recent developments, and we
conclude with a theoretical appraisal of the experience.
I. FRENCH PLANNING AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The French have done national economic planning since the end of World War
II. In principle the procedure has two interrelated elements, though the practice
has often fallen short of these ideals. The first is an attempt to coordinate
economic activity in the direction of pre-determined and hopefully socially
agreed targets. The second assumes that the choices made by private decision-
makers will be affected by the government's publication of predictions about the
future state of the economy.3 Under a completely decentralized system, private
agents would be making decisions on the basis of different and inconsistent
guesses about the plans of their competitors and the likely growth path of their
industry and of the economy as a whole. Indicative planning promotes the dis-
semination of government predictions and might be expected to produce a pattern
of investment which is more rational and less risky than the pure market outcome
without requiring any coercive public actions.
French planning was created at the instigation of Jean Monnet, a visionary
French public servant who went on to help found the European Coal and Steel
2. See S. ESTRIN & P. HOLMES, FRENCH PLANNING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 177-92 (1983).
3. Masse, French Planning and Economic Theory, 33 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1965).
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Community. Despite previous forms of state intervention, the First Plan in 1946
represented a major break with the past.4 Monnet was not a dirigiste trying to
create a comprehensive system for the centralized state control of French indus-
try. Rather he sought to use planning to create what was signally lacking in
France, a dynamic entrepreneurial capitalism. This entailed much government
intervention in the early years, but the objective was always the development of
the underlying structure of the industrial system rather than the day-to-day
management of resources.
Monnet's planners were very influential in helping to allocate Marshall Aid
funds for postwar reconstruction. They controlled financial resources that were
large relative to those of the private sector in the immediate postwar period, and
to some extent directed the investment of private companies. However, since the
1950s this line of influence has waned because most industrial investment has
been self-financed.
The Commissariat General au Plan (CGP) drafts the plan for the government
and persuades ministries to conform to its general spirit. Although its 100 staff
members are attached to the Premier's office, the CGP has no executive power
nor financial resources of its own. The plan normally lasts for five years and lays
down the key national priorities over the period without much operational detail.
Plan implementation depends on the functional ministries, above all the Ministry
of Finance. Relations between the CGP and Ministry of Finance have been
uneasy for most of the past twenty years, in part because of the innate conflict
between an agency devoted to long-term strategy and a ministry devoted to
responding flexibly to short-term problems.5 In recent years, the power of the
Industry Ministry has also grown.
In the four plans spanning the period 1952-1970 (the Second to Fifth Plans),
the authorities laid down overall targets or forecasts at the sectoral and industrial
level, but there was no attempt to enforce compliance from particular corpora-
tions.6 The planners' most important role in this period was probably exhortative
and informational, encouraging an atmosphere of modern business practice and
rationalization throughout French industry, both public and private. The period
from 1970 to 1981 under the conservative Presidents Pompidou and Giscard, and
in particular under Prime Minister Barre after 1976, saw an increasing reliance on
free market forces in what was by then a modern capitalist economy. In the Sixth
Plan (1970-75), the authorities explicitly recognized what had been the case for a
number of years, namely that they could not direct nor even guide the evolution
of the entire industrial sector.7 The main thrust of industrial policy therefore
shifted towards a few individual sectors, with the emphasis in recent years being
an increasing effort to base operational industrial policy on particular firms.8
The growth of French industrial production has been extraordinarily fast since
1946, particularly in comparison with prewar performance. Industrial output
4. See R. KUISEL, CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN MODERN FRANCE (1981).
5. See S. ESTRIN & P. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 89-120.
6. See J. McARTHUR & B. Scorr, INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN FRANCE 443-44 (1969).
7. Commissariat General au Plan, SIxTH PLAN 1971-75, at 51-55 (Documentation Francaise
1970).
8. See, e.g., Rapport sur l'Adaptation du 7e Plan, 59 (1978).
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normally grew even faster than the planners' forecast rate, at around 6 percent per
annum during the 1950s and 1960s and with a peak rate of nearly 10 percent per
annum in the late 1960s, though the pace slowed markedly in the 1970s. 9 Largely
on the basis of this industrial development, the French economy sustained a gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 5.7 percent between 1960 and 1970 and
3.6 percent between 1970 and 1980.10 This compares with 5.1 percent and 3.3
percent respectively for all developed economies taken together, and 4.7 percent
and 2.8 percent respectively for the members of the European Economic Com-
munity. II While the general impact of planning on the economy was undoubtedly
favorable,12 detailed analysis suggests that industrial policy in regards to particu-
lar sectors was less coherent and effective.13 Some rationalization of industrial
policy occurred in the late 1970s, but, although promises were made to give aid
to 'new' industries, the bulk of industrial subsidies supported traditional and
declining industries. 14
The Socialists took office in 1981, committed to far-reaching social and eco-
nomic reforms and short-term policies to tackle unemployment, both in the
framework of the plan. The budget was formally linked to the plan to a greater
degree than before, and a system of planning contracts was proposed to improve
implementation. On industrial policy, the Socialists promised less reliance on
market forces, aiming to program French industrial policy toward meeting long-
term employment and growth objectives. 15 At the heart of the new strategy was a
wave of nationalizations designed to give the state direct decision-making author-
ity in key industrial units, as well as leverage over the private sector via full
control over the banking system. This enlarged public sector, coherently planned
and committed to particular actions by contractual agreements, was to provide
the "motor" for French industrial regeneration, spearheading an upsurge in
private as well as public investment to lay the foundations for future employment.
The Socialists also promised a massive stimulation of French research and devel-
opment and government aid to support viable firms regardless of sector. 16
II. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN FRENCH
PLANNING, 1946-81.
There have been four phases of French interest in planning contracts: contrac-
tual arrangements for Monnet's First Plan, the anti-inflation contracts of the
9. See Estrin & Holmes, The Performance of French Planning 1952-78, 16 ECONOMICS OF
PLANNING 71-86 (1980).
10. UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, U.N. Doc. TD/STAT. 10
(Supp. 1982).
11. Id. at 354.
12. See J. CARRE, P. DUBOIS & E. MALINVAUD, FRENCH ECONOMIC GROWTH 458-495 (1975).
13. See J. McARTHUR & B. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 411-45; C. STOFFAES, LA GRANDE MENACE
INDUSTRIELLE 492-513 (1978); L. STOLERU, L'IMPERATIF INDUSTRIEL 174-87 (1969).
14. See, e.g., RAPPORT DU COMITE FINANCEMENT 212 (Documentation Francaise 1981).
15. COMMISSARIAT GENERAL AU PLAN, PLAN INTERIMAIRE 1982-83, at 147-49 (Documentation
Francaise 1983).
16. A typical example would be the speech by President Mitterrand in Ministry of Industry, UNE
POLITIQUE INDUSTRIELLE POUR LA FRANCE, at 416-22 (Documentation Francaise 1982).
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1960s and early 1970s, the contractual industrial policy programs of the 1970s,
and contracts in the new era of Socialist planning, post-1981. Differences among
these revolve around whether the contracts were developed independently in
particular Ministries or Departments or within the framework of the plan, and
whether they covered public corporations or private firms.
A. Contractual Arrangements During Monnet's First Plan
Planning contracts first appeared in Monnet's First Plan, which was primarily
concerned with stimulating postwar reconstruction, and took the form of invest-
ment programs, initially for six basic sectors of the economy.17 The plan prom-
ised "contractual agreements between the public authorities and the industry, to
furnish it with the necessary means (credit, materials, etc.) or to facilitate its
obtaining them."' 8 There is no evidence, however, as to whether such contracts
were undertaken. There is no reference to a contractual system in the various
reports on the realization of the First Plan. Moreover, there appears to have been
little reference to the notion of planning contracts during the 1950s when the
authorities gradually moved towards a freer market mechanism. During the 1950s
and 1960s, one goal was the creation of a "concerted economy," where planning
was seen as operating on the private sector by persuasion via the consultative
apparatus of the plan.19 The state may have been using its power to ensure that
particular private actions conformed with the plan, but this does not appear to
have been done through contractual agreements.
B. Anti-Inflation Contracts
Interest in the potential role of contracts in economic policy began to revive in
the mid-1960s as a part of a counter-inflation program. By 1965, a rigid system of
price controls was generating significant distortions, and the authorities sought to
give private producers more flexibility. Finance Minister Giscard introduced the
first contractual price policy, the Contrats de Stabilite, to be signed with repre-
sentatives of an industry, allowing firms adhering to the agreement to raise some
of their prices provided they lowered others to ensure that a norm was respected.20
In March 1966, Contrats de Programmes between the Ministry of Finance and
industrialists, either collectively for the entire sector or individually, were intro-
duced. These gave firms the authority to set prices at the level they desired in
return for meeting certain conditions with respect to enterprise or industry invest-
ments, exports, wages, professional training, regional location, and productiv-
ity.2' The authorities had the power to withdraw price setting freedom if the firm
17. See Dubois, La Planification Industrielle en France, 61 C COLLECTIONS DE L'I.N.S.E.E. 143
(May 1978).
18. Rapport General sur le Premier Plan de modernisation et d'equipement (Nov. 1946-Jan. 1947),
reprinted in V. Lrrz, CENTRAL PLANNING FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY 27 (1967).
19. See J. MCARTHUR & B. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 268-89.
20. See id. at 299.
21. Id.
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or industry failed to meet the conditions. They were initially signed for the
duration of the Fifth Plan, 1966-70, but the two sides reviewed the various
clauses and conditions annually and some contracts ran on until the early 1970s.22
The use of the French term "contrat" in this context does not imply that the
contracts had a traditional legal form. 3 Although these anti-inflation contracts
contained commitments in considerable detail, their legal status was still vague.
A related innovation was the Contrat de Progres, devised in 1969 and covering
the determination of wages in the public sector. The state sponsored meetings
between public enterprises and the relevant trade union officials to fix an increase
in wages for the coming year in light of expected inflation and likely changes in
corporate productivity. Although the authorities were not direct signatories of
these agreements, they were in principle similar to contrats de programmes, with
the firms offering workers real wage increases in return for concessions on
productivity.2 4
C. Contractual Industrial Policy Programs
During the 1970s two forms of planning contracts were used as instruments of
industrial policy covering the public and private sectors respectively, and in
phases corresponding to the Sixth and Seventh Plans. Contrats de programme
were signed with the major corporations in the late 1960s and early 1970s with
respect to the Sixth Plan and in about 1978 corresponding to the Seventh Plan
(1976-80).25 These met with varying degrees of success. Contracts were also
negotiated with various firms in the private sector. In principle this process was a
major basis of industrial policy, though in practice very few agreements of this
sort were actually signed. 6
1. Public Sector Contracts
To promote the granting of autonomy to companies in the public sector,2 7 in
1969 the state began signing contracts with the major nationalized corporations
22. Inflation escalated in 1971 and the government responded with a stricter system, the "Contrats
Anti'Hausse" which limited price increases on manufactured products to 1.5 percent for six months
without increases at all for services. The authorities effectively re-introduced a traditional anti-
inflation policy based on direct controls with the "Programmation Annuelle" of 1972.
23. Lutz notes that although voluntary, the contrats de programme were not necessarily legally
binding over the medium-term because of the possibility of changing circumstances. Moreover as
Jacquemin and Schrans point out, it is hard to imagine a French firm suing the government for
imposing price controls when it had said it would not, even though one can imagine legal regimes
under which firms might claim compensation in the courts in such circumstances. A. JACQUEMIN &
G. SCHRANS, LE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 40-61 (1970). Bazex notes that parliamentary procedure does
not permit the state to make budgetary authorisations running beyond the present year, though if it did
so and indeed did not obtain subsequent parliamentary approval, the party to whom funds were
promised could in principle sue. See Bazex, Contrats de Plan entre l'Etat et les entreprises in DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF, 20 February 1984, at 68-71.
24. OECD, THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF FRANCE 70 (1974).
25. See Y. CARSALADE, BILAN DES CONTRATS PASSES ENTRE L'ETAT ET LES ENTREPRISES
PUBLIQUES 20 (1982).
26. See C. STOFFAES, supra note 13, at 698.
27. See Y. CARSALADE, supra note 25, at 3.
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which reduced the need for detailed involvement in enterprise management by
the authorities without sacrificing scrutiny of overall objectives. They were
signed for initial periods of four or five years, and stressed giving state corpora-
tions greater financial responsibility. Indeed, except when the authorities required
particular services to be run at a loss, each contract required the firm to become at
least self-sufficient financially and contained targets with respect to productivity,
profitability, future trends in prices, loans, and capital acquisitions.2" However, in
general they did not cover wages, employment, regional issues, or consumers'
interests.29
The first two public sector contrats de programme were made with the state
railway company, SNCF, and the national electric utility, EDE30 They were
largely concerned with investment finance, investment goals, and productivity.
Each established greater managerial autonomy with respect to pricing and to
tariff structures. The 1969 SNCF contract provided for a gradual return to break
even, with an agreed, decreasing level of subsidies over the duration of the
contract.3
The EDF contract of 1970 defined certain features of the overall objectives of
EDF which the original nationalization law had not done.32 The contract also
established a posteriori accountability, relieving management of the obligation to
consult the government in advance of all decisions.
These two early contracts laid down a number of quantitative performance
indicators linked to projections of GNP growth with which firms were expected
to comply. 33 It was recognized that these would have to be varied if circumstances
changed, and rather than specify in advance detailed formulae for such adjust-
ments, each contract contained a safeguard clause which envisaged revision of
the agreement if the underlying economic hypotheses were not fulfilled. 34 The
safeguard clauses were later invoked after the oil crisis of 1973, and as a conse-
quence SNCF was effectively without a contract from 1974 to 1975 and there was
a delay before contracts were negotiated to cover the latter part of the 1970s.
Nevertheless, following another report to the Prime Minister on the manage-
ment of nationalized industries, negotiations began on a new generation of con-
tracts for virtually all the nationalized corporations. 35 The problems which hit the
earlier generation of contracts during their execution began to show up again,
during the negotiation phase. It proved impossible to secure an agreement with
EDF in 1978, particularly concerning the issue of compensation for any price
constraints imposed by the government above those envisaged in the contract.36
For SNCF it proved impossible to retain even the goal of a subsidy fixed in
advance, or a specified link between rail prices and overall inflation. However,
28. See id. at 6.
29. See id. at 7.
30. See id. at 8-10.
31. See id. at 10.
32. See id. at 8.
33. See id. at 15.
34. See id. at 14.
35. See id. at 4.
36. See id. at 20.
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the idea of setting the annual capital budget in the context of a long-term program
was effectively retained.
Contracts were signed at the same time with the coal company Charbonage de
France (CDF), Air France, and the shippers Compagnie Generale Maritime
(CGM). The CDF pact contained useful and interesting contingent clauses, link-
ing the subsidies payable by the state to certain economic indicators.37 However,
it was notably deficient in that state policy towards coal and the ties with elec-
tricity were never fully considered, and there does not seem to have been coordi-
nation with overall sectoral policy. The Air France contract was distinguished by
the very large number of performance indicators it contained, and it appears to
have been a success. In contrast, the CGM contract only ran for two years,
1978-80, because the state and management could not agree on a four year
program for restoring financial equilibrium. 38
This experience indicates some success in the achievement of intra-program
coherence, but there is little evidence of the overall inter-program coherence
desirable in a long-term contractual system linked to national planning. The
SNCF and EDF contracts were negotiated ostensibly within the framework of the
Sixth Plan, and the CGP was involved in their elaboration. The EDF contract
may have contributed to the emergence of a more coherent policy towards elec-
tricity,39 but the 1969 letter of intent underlying the SNCF contract was very
vague about the government's actual transport policy.40 One glaring inconsistency
between the two early contracts concerned the test discount rate to be used in
project appraisal; EDF was instructed to use the normal public sector or "plan"
rate, while SNCF was advised to use this figure plus 3 percent. 41 No sensible
economic rationale for this difference is apparent.
2. Private Sector Contracts
Contracts with the private sector were even less well integrated with the na-
tional plan during the 1970s, and the CGP was not directly involved with them at
all. Programme d'Actions Concertees was a general term used from the late
1960s to describe a diverse set of medium-term plans for the rationalization and
modernization of particular industries. 42 The first such industry program was for
steel in 1966. Later sectoral programs under the Sixth Plan included contractual
components, though the sectors chosen did not always accord with the plan's
declared objectives. 43 The state signed these contracts with trade associations,
promising financial aid in return for factory closures or conversions, personnel
redeployment, and retraining. Although the schemes remained voluntary, the
underlying idea was for the authorities to provide financial incentives for private
37. See id. at 16.
38. See id. at 12.
39. However, Carsalade notes how diversity of purpose on the government side obstructed the
signing of the contract. Id. at 20-21.
40. See id. at 10.
41. See id. at 20.
42. See OECD, supra note 24, at 69.
43. See Dubois, supra note 17, at 149.
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firms in backward sectors to modernize. 4 Premier Barre stressed accountability
and value for money in dealings with firms, and sought the promotion of struc-
tural adjustment in the direction of dynamic sectors rather than older industries,
in particular by supporting successful firms. 45 He stressed the Contrats de Crois-
sance" and Contrats de Developpement that were to be signed with these high
growth companies .4
In reality, French industrial policy vis-a-vis the private sector had for a long
time been less discretionary than is normally supposed." Aid to small- and
medium-sized firms was, for the most part, based on quasi-automatic criteria,
with more discriminating grants to large companies. 49 In the late 1970s, only a
very small group of large firms received help. In 1976, 56 percent of all aid to
industry went to nine firms, three of which were in the public sector and another
of which was partly state-owned. 50 It may appear from this concentration of aid
that grants to large firms were at least discretionary, but when the Socialists
arrived in power they discovered that the six groups, Dassault, CGE, Empain-
Schneider, SNIAS, Thomson, and CII-HB, which accounted for 10 percent of
value added in industry, were getting over 50 percent of public aid. 5' Thomson,
for example, enjoyed a protected market for public purchases and generous
subsidies for exports, and was getting most of its research and development paid
for by the state. These were benefits upon which the company had become totally
reliant in two senses: it needed them for survival, and it had managed to persuade
the state of this and thus knew the money was coming. There was therefore no
effective contractual conditionality; the firm was totally free of state control in
making its strategic decisions. 2
Non-discriminatory and non-discretionary criteria had attractions from a legal
perspective, but left industrial policy analysts worried that aid, though going to
firms which met the criteria, might not induce people to alter their behavior. Lack
of discretionary power is also undesirable when it locks the government into
maintaining grants agreed upon in the past. There was a widely perceived need
for legal scrutiny of the highly discriminatory agreements that were being signed
in this period, particularly to give opportunities to small firms not already perma-
nent clients of sponsoring departments.
Different from the contrats de croissance were the more widely used "aides
remboursables en cas de succes," in which the state would put up money for
44. A report to the Planning Commission, "Aides a l'industrie," 1982 gave a negative evaluation
of the subsidy programme observing that the overwhelming majority of industrial subsidies were
granted without any contractual conditionality.
45. See Rapport sur l'Adaptation du 7e Plan, supra note 8, at 65-66.
46. "Growth Contract."
47. Rapport sur l'Adaptation du 7e Plan, supra note 8, at 66.
48. See J. Bonnaud, Les instruments d'Execution du Plan Utilises par l'Etat a I'Egard des
Entreprises, 21 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 854-55 (1970).
49. Id. at 555.
50. This information was uncovered in the unpublished "Rapport Hannoun" the main findings of
which were reproduced in an appendix to a planning commission report and appear to have been
widely leaked. See RAPPORT DU COMITE FINANCEMENT, supra note 14, at 207-41, app. C4.
51. See P. GALAMBERT, LES SEPT PARADOXES DE LA POLITIQUE INDUSTRIELLE 129 (1982).
52. See id., at 130.
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innovation and would in effect share some of the risk with the firms.5 3 If the
project was a complete failure the state agreed to write off all the debt. But it
expected to be rewarded out of profits, though without going so far as to take a
direct equity stake in the venture. The administration of this scheme was carried
out by the agency ANVAR (Agence Nationale pour la Valorisation de la Re-
cherche) which was responsible for promoting research. ANVAR supported up to
50 percent of an innovation program, and drew up an agreement for certain
performance guarantees to be reached in return for the receipt of aid.14 The firm
had to pay the money back for those agreements with which it had failed to
comply.
D. Contracts Under Socialist Planning
Attempts were made following the arrival of the Socialists in power to con-
struct an inventory of all industrial aid, of which there were estimated to be at
least 300 types." The CGP classified aids by type of sector-growing versus
declining; and by type of aid-those with a contractualized purpose versus those
being given "on a subscription basis." '56 It was found that the overwhelming
majority were "subscription" aids to firms in trouble, and the pattern of con-
centration had not changed since 1976. Indeed, one of the reasons for the na-
tionalizations of 1982 was the state's fear of having to subsidize permanently the
research and development of private firms.
The new government asked the newly-established Commission on the Reform
of Planning to investigate all aspects of planning, including planning contracts.
Its report was rather critical of the 1970s experience, noting that the contrats de
programme with state firms had frequently been abrogated and devoid of sanc-
tions. As to the private sector, it noted that in many cases the contrats had not in
fact been contracts in a meaningful sense. Contrats de development had been
used to consolidate relations between large firms and a variety of administrative
bodies, and certain of the contrats had been based on retrospective performance
criteria with no sanctions if future commitments were not respected.5 7
III. POST-1983 PLANNING CONTRACTS
The new Socialist regime was strongly committed to revitalizing planning and
to contractualizing future state aid. The Report of the Commission for the Reform
of Planning (1982) also called for major reforms in the previous contractual
53. See C. STOFFAES, supra note 13, at 697.
54. See, e.g., RAPPORT AU PARLEMENT SUR LES FONDS PUBLICS ATTRIBUES A TITRES D'AIDES
AUX ENTREPRISES INDUSTRIELLES, PORTANT REGLEMENT DEFINITIF DU BUDGET DE 1979, at 72
(1981).
55. See J. DUTAiLLY, LA POLITIQUE INDUSTRIELLE INTROUVABLE 9 (Nov. 1983) (I.N.S.E.E.
Ministry of Finance memo presented to the CNRS Colloquium).
56. CGP, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION SUR LA REFORME DE LA PLANIFICATION 89-90 (1982).
57. See Loi sur la Reforme de la Planification., Law No. 82-653, July 30, 1982 Journal Officiel
[JO.] (France); Neuvieme Plan, Premiere Loi de Plan Law No. 83-645, July 17, 1983 J.O.; Neu-
vieme Plan, Deuxieme Loi de Plan. Law no. 83-1180, Dec. 30, 1983 J.O.
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system, urging that signature of planning contracts be made compulsory for state
enterprises and voluntary for private firms. 8 A new planning mechanism was
passed into law in July 1982 specifying two legislative acts to effectuate the
plan.5 9 The first, which was to lay down general objectives, was published for the
Ninth Plan in the spring of 1983 and passed, after amendment, in the summer.
The second, passed in the autumn of 1983, quantified the elements of the plan
more precisely and set forth mechanisms and financial resources for implementa-
tion, including all multi-annual expenditure programs.
The 1982 law outlines the new general framework for planning contracts. The
state may make contracts with local or regional authorities, public or private
enterprises, and with any other legal entity. For firms, the contracts are to specify
"the main strategic orientations of the enterprise and the way in which they are
compatible with the objectives of the plan. '6 The law specifies that draft plan-
ning contracts and their conditions must be discussed with institutional represen-
tatives of the work force. Capital grants, subsidies, loan guarantees, tax
concessions and other financial aids are to be consistent with the budget of
special provisions in the Second Plan Law under procedures laid down in the
1982 law.6
1
Planning contracts have been in fact initiated between the state and regions as a
way of achieving decentralization as well injecting some discipline into local
spending. The state hoped to avoid open-ended subsidies and to give local au-
thorities greater responsibility. 62 On the industrial side, planning contracts were
also signed with the major nationalized enterprises, but they were not used to
regulate relations with the private sector.63
The government hoped that these new contracts would lead firms to elaborate
medium-term plans consistent with that of the state. 64 The intention was not to
divert firms from the profitable toward the unprofitable, but to achieve macro-
economic goals which were in the long-term interests of both the state and
corporations. The state would declare itself willing to underwrite certain risks
necessary for the attainment of particular objectives. 65 However, it was not clear
how these goals could be put into practice, since support of risk-bearing could so
easily degenerate into pure subsidy, as happened with export credits.
The contracts with public enterprises were drawn up between the Ministry of
Industry and the firms concerned, though the CGP was consulted, particularly
with regard to the macroeconomic implications of the firms' financial require-
ments. There was an indirect connection between the overall objectives of the
58. Article 11 of Loi sur la Reforme de la Planification, supra note 57.
59. RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION SUR LA REFORME DE LA PLANIFICATION, supra note 56, at 90.
60. Id. at art. 4.
61. See Politique Industrielle et Contrats de Plan en 1984, at 212 Cahiers Francais 1-4 (Supp. note
8, 1983).
62. See Premier Bilan des Contrats de Plan Etat-Region at 4 (Commissariat au Plan, June 1984,
unpublished).
63. See Y. CARSALADE, supra note 25, at 28-29.
64. Its ability to bear risks more efficiently was a point stressed previously by C. So'FFAES, supra
note 13, at 586-87.
65. B. MIGNUCCI, L'EXPERIENCE DES CONTRATS DE PLAN ETAT-ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES 5
(1983).
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Ninth Plan and individual planning contracts. The five plan priorities were saving
energy, modernizing industry, reinforcing manufacturing competitiveness, devel-
oping agro-industries and promoting new technology; each suggested possible
criteria with which to evaluate investment programs at the enterprise level. 66 The
actual contracts laid down a number of general and specific objectives for each
firm, and the whole exercise reflected a general desire to achieve a financial
balance for the entire public sector, with the possible exception of steel, by 1986.
The Ministry of Industry requested the newly nationalized French industrial
enterprises to submit corporate plans in July 1982. The plans were to contain the
macroeconomic assumptions made, the outline of a "portfolio" of activities in
which the firms were engaged, and a breakdown of the groups' strategic objec-
tives. 67 Having requested the firms to specify their own macroeconomic assump-
tions, the government did not impose centrally planned figures. Signed during
1983, the planning contracts had four elements: a general statement of the objec-
tives of the group itself; a statement of how it was to ensure coherence with the
objectives expressed in the Ninth Plan; an agreement on financial support by the
state for the firm, which was only specified for the year 1983; and safeguard
clauses. 68 In fact budgetary procedures make it impossible to pre-commit funds
from one year to the next, which forced the state to adopt a loose form of
commitment; this means the engagements expressed in the contract were stronger
than an expectation but weaker than a "right" .69
The contracts themselves have not been published, and only summaries to-
gether with official and unofficial commentaries are available. 70 Several of them
appear to give quite detailed objectives for the growth of investment over the
period to 1986, even though the state guaranteed funds only for 1983. For exam-
ple, Renault proposed an objective of raising its share from 6.5 percent to 7
percent of the world car market by introducing a new model every year. The
EMC chemicals group promised to invest 1.7 billion francs in the three year
period to 1986 in return for which the state offered capital of 250 million francs
for 1983. The firm also laid down quantitative targets for the growth of research
and development, and expressed various objectives for employment and growth
of exports.
Observers have remarked that the funds the state declared itself willing to give
are small in relation to the investment earlier declared necessary. 71 In electronics,
for example, the sums promised in the planning contracts fell far short of the
need estimated by an official study group in 1982.72 Doubts therefore existed
66. Id. at 6.
67. See id. at 8-9.
68. See POLITQUE INDUSTRIELLE ET CONTRATS DE PLAN EN 1984, supra note 61, at 1-4 (Supp.
notes 7-8); Ministry of Industry Debat de Strategie Industrielle 55-72 (1983).
69. See Bazex, supra note 23, at 71. In fact budgetary procedures make it impossible to pre-
commit funds from one year to the next, which forced the state to adopt a loose form of commitment;
this means the engagements expressed in the contrat were stronger than an expectation but weaker
than a "right."
70. Dethomas, Le glissement vers un capitalisme d'dtat?, p. 19, col. 1, LE MONDE (Feb. 14, 1984).
71. Quatrepoint, La Filiere electronique: Discours et Realite, in Bilan de l'Annee Economique et
Sociale, LE MONDE 175 (1983).
72. Dethomas, supra note 70.
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about whether the objectives laid down in the planning contracts were consistent
with the financial means provided. The inability of the state to give even a
minimum guarantee of funding for years beyond the first undermined the whole
concept of sustaining a medium-term strategy and insulating the firms from short-
term financial pressures. The fact that the groups were nationalized and losing
money very heavily cut them off from other sources of internal and external
funds. If the state itself is subject to pressures that prevent it from making long-
term commitments, then the position of any one firm is even more vulnerable and
it is all the more likely that the objectives in the planning contracts will have to be
changed. This highlights the need for contingent objectives or agreed procedures
for on-going revision of the contracts.
The initial evaluation of Socialist planning contracts is not wholly negative,
however. A number of firms were forced to go through long-term planning for the
first time and to think through the macroeconomic effects of their actions. The
state was able to get itself closely involved with a number of companies whose
policies are important to the national economy, while minimizing detailed day-to-
day interference in management. The corporate strategies chosen were adopted
by management itself and were not dictated by the state.73 On the whole however,
the content of the planning, especially the quantitative aspect, is considered to be
less important than the negotiations which preceded them and forced the manage-
ments to rethink and clarify corporate strategy.74 For the newly nationalized
firms, losses were being reduced and the planning contracts, at least in principle,
underlined the refusal of the state to underwrite losses on an open-ended basis.
Further measures to reduce employment in state firms announced in February
1984 indicated that a close relationship between state and firm, even ownership,
does not prevent rationalization. It is too early to see whether the contractual
system can guarantee the implementation of long-term objectives, but the notion
remains worthy of attention.
IV. THEORETICAL COMMENTS
The first theoretical justification for non-coercive planning came from Plan-
ning Commissioner Pierre Masse.75 The Fourth Plan promised to be self-fulfilling
by virtue of its representing a calculated "general equilibrium" of all agents in
the economy at the end-date of the plan. If the economy were genuinely com-
petitive and if the only kind of uncertainty prevailing arose from other actors'
decisions, then people would spontaneously choose to do what the plan had
forecast. In fact, the Fourth Plan stated that all necessary policy instruments
would be deployed to ensure plan fulfillment. Even so, the planners overesti-
mated what could be achieved by reducing the uncertainty emanating merely
from firms' failure to inform each other of their future intentions, the "endoge-
nous" component of uncertainty. Even if a firm were aware of the government's
goals for the next few years and fully expected other actors to behave consistently
73. Masse, supra note 3.
74. See L. ZINSOU, LE FER DE LANCE 128 (1985).
75. C. STOFFAES, supra note 13, at 697-98.
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with those targets, it might not go along, either because it could not decide on its
own course of action or because it sought to keep all options for flexibility.
Social benefits might arise, however, from a greater degree of medium-term
pre-commitment by firms than they would opt for voluntarily. This is one aspect
of the broader rationale for national planning. But if the state gives firms incen-
tives to secure a particular outcome, they may be required to bear additional risk
if other parameters do not turn out as the government anticipates. They will
require compensation for shouldering this risk. It may be hard to agree on the
appropriate cash value of this burden if firms and the state disagree on the
likelihood of target fulfillment or the desirability of the state's chosen outcome. If
the authorities offer cash conditional on certain performance outcomes, other
policy inconsistencies arise. First, the state cannot easily monitor the extent to
which favorable outcomes are indeed the result of actions elicited by the incentive
system.7 6 Moreover, if bonuses are given only in the event of good performance,
it may actually increase the riskiness of the firms' profitability. On the other hand,
where conditional payments are in the form of compensation for unfavorable
outcomes, such as cost escalation insurance underwritten by the state, then there
is an incentive to bring about the undesirable case, or at least to avoid it with less
zeal.
The problem of incentives is particularly acute in the case of arrangements
such as the contrats de croissance. The firm is obtaining the reverse of equity
finance from the state: if it succeeds it receives the double bonus of extra profits
and avoids the cost of repayment. But if it fails it makes no profits and must repay
the state. This raises the question of what to do if the firm experiences severe
difficulties. The government could further burden a company already in trouble
by demanding it repay previous state aid. One commentator has suggested that
this scheme could therefore only be used for subsidiaries of otherwise large and
healthy firms whose other activities could cross-subsidize the repayments.7 7 This
arrangement would make sense if "success" were being measured in non-profit
terms, for example if a firm were invited to grow faster than was profitable in
order to secure a foothold for French suppliers in some fast growing industry.
This example illustrates the sort of problems the state can face with incentives in
contractual arrangements.
The mere existence of a contract does not rule out opportunistic behavior. It is
often better for parties to establish "implicit contracts," where each side learns
to act responsibly towards the other in expectation of a similar response, rather
than writing explicit contracts. Labor market studies have highlighted the effec-
tiveness of such arrangements between employees and employers, where the
building of mutual trust improves flexibility and performance. Whether this is
feasible in government-business relations is another matter.
76. Some French government officials in private conversation suggested that the management of
some state enterprises had deliberately overstated the degree of financial difficulty in 1983 in order to
profit from the perception of a major improvement in 1984 and 1985. In the nature of things there is no
firm evidence for or against this hypothesis.
77. See, e.g., Williamson, Wachter and Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The
Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. EcON. 250-78 (1975).
